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UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA V WEBER:
TITLE VII REVISED
INTRODUCTION
In 1974 the United Steelworkers of America and the Kaiser Aluminum
and Chemical Corporation entered into a master collective bargaining
agreement covering terms and conditions of employment at fifteen Kaiser
plants. This agreement included an affirmative action program designed to
increase minority representation in skilled craft jobs in Kaiser's factories.
The plan provided for the establishment of a new in-house apprenticeship
program. For every nonminority applicant accepted into the program not
less than one minority applicant was to enter until the ratio of minority to
nonminority craftsmen equalled the corresponding ratio in the local labor
force. I
In the agreement's first year of operation at the Gramercy, Louisiana
plant, thirteen craft trainees were selected from the hourly work force. Of
these, seven were black. Within each racial classification the most senior
employee applying was selected; however, some of the successful black appli-
cants had less seniority than their white co-workers who would have been
selected but for the one black-one white requirement. Brian Weber was in
the latter class, and when his application was denied he filed suit against
Kaiser and the union, charging that the program discriminated against him
and other members of his class in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.2 The district court agreed with this contention and enjoined
the defendants from denying Weber and his class access to on-the-job train-
ing on the basis of race.3 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed with one
dissent. 4 The Supreme Court reversed,
5 holding that title VII did not pro-
hibit private parties from voluntarily adopting affirmative action programs
to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in job categories that were tradi-
tionally segregated.
6
I. THE FACTUAL SETTING
Prior to 1974, only 1.8% 7 of skilled craft workers and only 14.8%8 of all
employees at Kaiser's Gramercy plant were black. This was in stark contrast
to the racial composition of the surrounding area in which 39% of the work
force was black.9 Although Kaiser had apparently been recruiting black
1. 1974 Labor Agreement, pertinent parts reprihted tn Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 763 (E.D. La. 1976).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
3. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761.
4. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
5. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
6. Id. at 2730.
7. Id. at 2725.
8. 415 F. Supp. at 764.
9. 99 S. Ct. at 2725.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
craftsmen,' 0 the company had a five-year prior experience requirement
which, because of historical discrimination by craft unions, few blacks were
able to meet. 1' Consequently, Kaiser and the union were under a great deal
of pressure to adopt an affirmative action program to increase minority rep-
resentation in skilled craft positions. First, there was the constant threat of
title VII litigation by minorities. A Kaiser plant in nearby Chalmette, Loui-
siana, had recently been sued under title VII due, in part, to the small per-
centage of black craftsmen.12 Second, the Office of Federal Contracts
Compliance (hereinafter referred to as the OFCC), which was responsible for
the administration of the President's anti-discrimination program,' was en-
couraging Kaiser to increase its minority representation. In 1971, the OFCC
had found violations of its regulations in a compliance review of Kaiser's
operations. 14 These infractions, if not corrected, could have resulted in a
number of sanctions against Kaiser including cancellation of its government
contracts. 15 Therefore, Kaiser dropped its five-year experience requirement
and, together with the union, established an apprenticeship program based
on OFCC suggestions. The plan was patterned after the consent decree en-
tered for the steel industry in the massive case of United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Industries, Inc. '6 No sooner had this occurred, however, than the pro-
gram was struck down by the courts as violating the civil rights of Kaiser's
white employees.
II. THE LEGAL SETTING
The particular provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that Kaiser's
program was said to violate are sections 703(a), 703(d), and 7030). Section
10. 415 F. Supp. at 764. But see Petition for Certiorari of United States and EEOC at 18.
11. 99 S. Ct. at 2725.
12. Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
2417 (1979). The court held, inter a/ia, that evidence showing less than three percent of Kaiser's
craftsmen were black, when compared to the percentage of black hourly employees, was entitled
to substantial, if not dispositive, weight in assessing whether plaintiff had established a prima
facie case of discrimination. 575 F.2d at 1389.
13. The OFCC acts under the Secretary of Labor who is charged with the administration
of Executive Order No. 11,246. That order, one of a series in effect since 1941, requires federal
contractors to take affirmative action to insure that applicants for jobs are treated without re-
gard to their race. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 Compilation), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1232-36 (1976).
14. The OFCC found that Kaiser had waived prior experience requirements for white
craftsmen but not for blacks. Kaiser also had apparently failed to recruit black craftsmen. Peti-
tion for Certiorari of United States and EEOC at 18.
15. Other possible sanctions include enforcement or criminal proceedings by the Depart-
ment of Justice and debarment from further government contracts. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3
C.F.R. 339, 343-44 (1964-65 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app., at 1234-35
(1976).
16. 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). This was a suit brought
on behalf of the Secretary of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
against nine major steel companies and the United Steel Workers of America. The proceeding
involved over 240 plants employing more than 300,000 people and alleged widespread practices
of discrimination in hiring and job assignments. The suit culminated in two lengthy consent
decrees providing inter alia for: (1) immediate reform of seniority systems to remove the continu-
ing effects of past discrimination; (2) establishment of goals and timetables for fuller utilization
of females and minorities; and (3) establishment of a $30,000,000 back pay fund to be paid to
the victims of the unlawful practices alleged in the complaint.
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703(a) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any indi-
vidual on the basis of race with respect to terms or privileges of his employ-
ment or to classify employees in a way which would tend to deprive them of
opportunities because of their race. 17 Section 703(d) makes it unlawful to
discriminate against employees in admission to apprenticeship programs on
the basis of race.' 8 Section 7030) states that nothing in title VII shall be
interpreted to require an employer to grant preferential treatment to any
group merely on account of a racial imbalance in the work force.' 9
Until the Weber case, the Supreme Court appeared to be of the opinion
that these provisions were intended to promote the use of individual merit
rather than race as the criterion for hiring and promotion in employment.
20
In Grzggs v. Duke Power Co. the Court had declared that, far from disparaging
job qualifications, Congress, by enacting title VII, made such qualifications
the controlling factor so that race became irrelevant.2 ' Just as discrimina-
tion was made illegal, so too was preferential treatment for any race. 22 "Dis-
criminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, [was] precisely
and only what Congress [had] proscribed.
'23
Despite these developments, there had come to be a well-recognized ex-
ception to the rule against racial preferences. Preferential hiring and promo-
tion have often been ordered by courts as an equitable remedy for an
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) specifically provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire.or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1976) specifically provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organiza-
tion, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other train-
ing or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or
employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2() (1976), entitled "Preferential treatment not to be granted on
account of existing number or percentage imbalance," specifically provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any em-
ployer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management commit-
tee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to
any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual
or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number
or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed
by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or
labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or
admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in com-
parison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the avail-
able work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
20. In Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), a sex dis-
crimination case, the Court characterized title VII as "a statute that was designed to make race
irrelevant in the employment market . Id. at 709.
21. 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
22. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993, 998 (2d Cir. 1976).
23. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431.
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employer's past discrimination. 24 Indeed, title VII itself appears to contem-
plate such relief where appropriate to remedy past discrimination.2 5 The
rationale for the preference is that it is merely the consequence of a court's
equitable power to make an injured party whole. The fact that the remedy
is fashioned along racial lines merely reflects that the injury was inflicted in
racial terms.
26
Even as a remedy for past discrimination the validity of preferential
treatment has been questioned, 27 and in Regents of the Un'versit' of Califo'rna v.
Bakke, 28 Justice Powell reaffirmed the importance of limiting preferential
treatment to remedial situations. He pointed out that the Court had never
approved a racial classification aiding minorities at the expense of other in-
nocent individuals in the absence of some official finding of discrimination.
29
The difficulty with this limitation was that the Court had also recog-
nized that statistics showing a racial imbalance could be used by title VII
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. 30 These rules
created a dilemma for employers. On the one hand, they were faced with
the threat of title VII litigation by minorities if there was a racial imbalance
in the work force. On the other hand, employers who sought to correct the
imbalance by granting preferential treatment to the underrepresented class
were in danger of title VII liability to whites for "reverse discrimination.
'31
Indeed, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 32 the Court had held
that title VII protected whites just as much as blacks from employment dis-
crimination. 33 The only way for employers to avoid this dilemma would be
to admit past discrimination against the group sought to be preferred. The
racial preference could then be defended on the grounds that it was remedial
in nature and hence within the exception to title VII. But this would be, at
best, a Pyrrhic victory for the employers because they would be admitting
liability to the victims of their discrimination, which could include responsi-
bility for back pay.
34
Faced with these alternatives, most employers could be expected to do
24. See, e.g., EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977). In Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), the Court recognized the appropriateness of such
affirmative relief under certain circumstances. Id. at 774.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) specifically provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intention-
ally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by
the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsi-
ble for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate.
26. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d at 224-25.
27. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. at 781 passim (Powell, J., dissenting).
28. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
29. d. at 307.
30. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973).
31. See, e.g., EEOC Decision 75-268, 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1502 (1975).
32. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
33. Id. at 280. Note, however, that the Court specifically declined to rule upon the appli-
cation of this principle to affirmative action programs. Id. at 280 n.8.
34. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d at 231 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
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nothing to correct conspicuous racial imbalances in their work force. Kai-
ser's treatment in the lower courts in the Weber case indicated the fate an
adventurous employer could expect for adopting an effective affirmative ac-
tion program that was not a response to the employer's past discrimination.
This situation seemed at odds with the policy of the Civil Rights Act favor-
ing voluntary cessation of discrimination and informal resolution of racial
problems in employment. The reconciliation of these conflicting rules and
policies was the task to which the Supreme Court addressed itself in Weber.
III. THE DECISION
The majority, speaking through Justice Brennan, emphasized at the
outset that Congress' primary purpose in enacting title VII was to create
employment opportunities for blacks in areas from which they had tradition-
ally been excluded.3 5 To read the statute as prohibiting the kind of affirma-
tive action taken by Kaiser and the union would frustrate that purpose and
the policy favoring voluntary compliance. Thus, the Court relied heavily on
the fact that section 703j) only stated that preferential treatment cannot be
required. The statute does not say that preferential treatment is prohbited.
36
This omission was said to mean that Congress intended to leave employers
free to adopt plans to achieve a racially balanced work force. This conclu-
sion was bolstered by evidence that section 7030) was added to the bill to
allay the fears of many legislators in 1964 that title VII would increase gov-
ernmental intrusion into the private affairs of companies and unions.37 To
read section 7030) as a federal prohibition against private racial balancing
would be to introduce just the element of governmental interference with the
private sector that the section was designed to prevent. Finally, the majority
emphasized the reasonableness of the plan, noting that the program was
temporary and created no absolute bar to the advancement of white employ-
ees.
38
In a bitter dissent, Justice Rehnquist accused the majority of not only
ignoring the plain language of title VII and the legislative history behind it
but also of deviating from what had been, up until now, the unswerving
interpretation of the statute by the Court. 39 Chief Justice Burger agreed,
accusing the majority of amending title VII to achieve what it regarded as a
desirable result.4°
Justice Blackmun questioned the soundness of the majority's reading of
the statute, but concurred on the theory that there ought to be an exception
to title VII allowing employers who have committed "arguable violations"
of the statute to take responsive action without liability to whites.4 1 Justices
Stevens and Powell took no part in the decision.
35. 99 S. Ct. at 2727.
36. Id. at 2729.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2730.
39. Id. at 2736-37.
40. Id. at 2734-35.
41. Id. at 2731. This is the theory Judge Wisdom relied on in his forceful dissent from the
opinion of the majority of the court of appeals. See 563 F.2d at 227.
19801
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY'S OPINION
A. The Legzslative Intent
The plain language of sections 703(a) and (d)42 seems to indicate that
the racial balancing system adopted by Kaiser and the union discriminated
against Brian Weber because of his race. Not only were certain applicants
selected for the craft training program over the more senior Weber because
they were black, but at least one position was open to blacks only; Weber,
being white, could not even apply.43 The program classified Weber in a way
that tended to deprive him of employment opportunities because of his race
in violation of section 703(a)(2) and thus discriminated against him in viola-
tion of sections 703(a)(1) and (d). Normally, given such clear language, the
rules of statutory construction would not permit the Court to consider ex-
trinsic matter such as evidence of the legislative intent.44 It could be argued,
however, that title VII is nevertheless ambiguous, thus justifying an inquiry
into the legislative history.
The Civil Rights Act seems to have been adopted for the purpose of
eliminating traditional race discrimination, i.e., the kind that is caused by
actual or subconscious hostility toward the group discriminated against. 45
Thus, it could be asserted that the Act is ambiguous in its application to
possible race discrimination not founded on distaste for a white "victim" but
caused by a benign attempt to eliminate the vestiges of society's discrimina-
tion against blacks. 46 Even if this contention is accepted, a resort to the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act does not seem to uncover any sup-
port for the majority's conclusion that the Act permits private racial balanc-
ing. Justice Rehnquist's dissent effectively catalogues the numerous
occasions during the congressional debates when it was unequivocally de-
clared that title VII would prohibit employers from discriminating against or
'n favor of an employee because of his race.47 Any deliberate attempt to
42. See notes 17 & 18 supra.
43. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. at 764.
44. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 490 (1917).
45. The Act "provides the means of terminating the most serious types of discrimination."
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2391, 2393. Citing remarks made by various senators and congressmen during the debates, the
union pointed out that title VII was aimed at "acts of 'ugliness', 'intolerance', 'bigotry', 'bias',
'prejudice', and 'racial preference'." Brief for Petitioner United Steel Workers of America at 20.
46. Even this argument is subject to doubt. Senator Humphrey defined discrimination
very broadly as different "treatment given to different individuals because of their different race
.... .110 CONG. REc. 5423 (1964).
47. 99 S. Ct. at 2741-51. "The bill would do no more than prevent ... employers from
discriminating against or in favor of workers because of their race, religion, or national origin."
110 CONG. REc. 1518 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Cellar). "Employers and labor organizations
could not discriminate in favor of or against a person because of his race, his religion or his
national origin. In such matters . . . the bill now before us . . . is colorblind." Id. at 6564
(remarks of Sen. Kuchel).
[I]f a business has been discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-white
working force, when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be
simply to fill future vacancies on a non-discriminatory basis. He would not be
obliged--or indeed permitted--to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer
Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give them special seniority
rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier.
Id. at 7213 (mem. of Sens. Clark & Case).
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maintain a racial balance would, it was stated, be a violation of title VII
because it would mean that employment decisions were being made on the
basis of race.48 This the Act strictly prohibited.
49
In support of its conclusion, the majority relied in part on language in
the House of Representatives' report accompanying the Civil Rights Act.
50
The report states that, in addition to dealing with the most glaring discrimi-
nation, the Civil Rights Act would "create an atmosphere conducive to vol-
untary resolution of other forms of discrimination."'" This suggested that
Congress did not intend to prohibit private voluntary affirmative action pro-
grams. Even if it is assumed, however, that one of those "other forms of
discrimination" was a numerical underrepresentation of minorities in skilled
jobs,52 the issue of the validity of the means chosen to overcome the discrimi-
nation still remains. Merely because an affirmative action program is volun-
It [the title] does not provide that any quota systems may be established to maintain
racial balance in employment. In fact, the title would prohibit preferential treatment
for any particular group, and any person, whether or not a member of any minority
group, would be permitted to file a complaint of discriminatory employment practices.
Id. at 11,848 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
48. 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (mem. of Sens. Clark & Case). See also the memorandum
from the Department of Justice, introduced by Senator Clark, which stated:
There is no provision . . . in title VII . . .that requires or authorizes any Federal
agency or Federal court to require preferential treatment for any individual or any
group for the purpose of achieving racial balance . . . . No employer is required to
maintain any ratio of Negroes to whites . . . . On the contrary, any deliberate at-
tempt to maintain a given balance would almost certainly run afoul of title VII be-
cause it would involve a failure or refusal to hire some individual because of his race
... . What title VII seeks to accomplish, what the civil rights bill seeks to accom-
plish, is equal treatment for all.
Id. at 7207.
49. Id. at 1518 (remarks of Rep. Cellar); id. at 6465 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel); id. at 8921
(remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 11,848 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
In his dissent in Fransv. Bowman Transp. Co., Justice Powell speaks of "the kind of preferen-
tial treatment forbidden by § 7030) . . ." (emphasis added) and describes that provision as a
"bar" to preferential treatment. 424 U.S. at 792-93. In Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534
F.2d at 998, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that "[a]ll agree, as do we, that
the non-remedial distortion of a seniority system through preferential treatment based solely
upon race is a form of reverse discrimination speciftcalyproscribed by Congress." 534 F.2d at 998
(emphasis added). "[Cireating fictional employment time for newly-hired Negroes would com-
prise preferential rather than remedial treatment. The clear thrust of the Senate debate is di-
rected against such preferential treatment on the basis of race." Local 198, United Papermakers
v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970), citediwith approval
in Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 508 F.2d 687, 709 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, sub nom. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. EEOC, 425 U.S. 998 (1976). In Waters v.
Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
997 (1976), the court upheld against a title VII attack a seniority system that had a last hired-
first fired feature. The court stated that "[t]o hold otherwise would be tantamount to shackling
white employees with a burden of past discrimination created not by them but by their em-
ployer. Title VII was not designed to nurture such reverse discriminatory preferences." 502
F.2d at 1320.
The commentators on the Act were largely in accord that nonremedial preferences were
illegal. See, e.g., Employment Dicrimination and Ttle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 1109, 1114-15 (1971). See also Note, The Employer's Dilemma: Qyotas, Reverse Discrimznation,
and Volunitag Compliance, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 369, 373 (1977) in which the author states: "[T]he
legislative history strongly suggests that the section [7030)] was intended to expressly prohibit the
use of preferential practices by employers."
50. 99 S. Ct. at 2728.
51. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprtntedin [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2355, 2393.
52. Section 7030) of the Act which is entitled "Preferential treatment not to be granted on
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tary does not mean that it is consistent with title VII. Any affirmative action
program must be reconciled with the Act's mandate that each ind'idual's
right to be free from discrimination be respected.
53
The other argument advanced by the majority was that section 703(j)
states only that employers may not be required to engage in racial balancing.
It does not say that they are not permitted to do so.54 The Court pointed out
that opponents of title VII expressed two fears during the congressional de-
bates. 55 First, they charged that the word "discrimination" would be inter-
preted by the federal government to include the existence of a racial
imbalance in a factory. The government would then require the employer
to racially balance his work force. Second, the legislators argued that even if
not required to do so, employers would voluntarily prefer minorities in order
to correct racial imbalances. Since, the argument went, section 703(j) only
speaks to the first objection, it must be concluded that Congress did not
intend to prohibit employers from voluntarily giving minorities preferential
treatment.
56
The fallacy of this argument, however, is that there does not seem to be
any evidence to support the inference that the words "or permitted" were
left out because of some deliberate decision by Congress to leave employers
free to prefer minorities. The Court arrived at its conclusion by means of a
subtle distortion of the meaning of the legislative history of the statute. The
remarks of Senator Sparkman to which the majority referred5 7 did not ex-
press the concern that employers would voluntarily engage in racial balanc-
ing even if not required. No one had ever suggested that title VII would
permit this. In light of the clear language of sections 703(a) and (d) such a
contention would have been considered somewhat frivolous. 58 Senator
Sparkman was concerned that even though the bill did not expressly require
quotas, the agents charged with the administration of title VII would put
pressure on employers with unbalanced work forces to adopt preferential
programs. 59 Although proponents of the Act assured the Senator that such
account of existing number or percentage imbalance" strongly suggests that Congress did not
want mere racial imbalances to be illegal. See note 19 supra.
53. In Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), the Court stated that "[i]t is
clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by title VII is to provide an equal opportunity
for each applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether members of the applicant's race
are already proportionately represented in the work force." Id. at 579. In Los Angeles Dep't of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), the Court noted that "[t]he statute's focus on
the individual is unambiguous. It precludes treatment of individuals as simply components of a
racial . . . class." 1d. at 708. The basic policy of the Act "requires that we focus on fairness to
individuals rather than fairness to classes." Id. at 709.
54. 99 S. Ct. at 2728-29.
55. Id. at 2729.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Justice Rehnquist forcefully pointed this out in his dissent. See 99 S. Ct. at 2748-49.
59. See 110 CONG. REC. 8618-19 (1964). Senator Sparkman showed impressive foresight in
predicting the practical administration of title VII over the years. He charged that the EEOC
would use any underrepresentation of minorities as evidence of discrimination and would pres-
sure the employer into adopting some type of quota system. He noted that "[sluch a tendency
has already been observed under the President's voluntary employment opportunities program.
Employers have been threatened with the loss of their Government contracts if they did not
comply." Id. at 8618. Senator Keating's response to this charge is very interesting. He said:
[Vol. 57:4
TITLE VII REVISED
a result would be impossible, 60 the concern over the possible imposition of
quotas was so pervasive that section 7030) was added to make the prohibi-
tion explicit. 6 1 Hence, section 7030) does not deal with the issue of volun-
tary preferences and does not seem to be authority for the proposition that
they are permissible.
B. The Federal Interference Argument
The Court found additional support for its conclusion that title VII left
employers and unions free to engage in racial balancing in the fact that title
VII was designed to prevent undue governmental intrusion into the private
affairs of business.62 A holding that it prohibited race-conscious conduct
would increase the role of the federal government and interfere with man-
agement prerogatives. There is no question that this was an important con-
cern of many of the members of the Eighty-eighth Congress,6 3 but the
Court's use of this argument is rather ironic because its ruling seems to au-
thorize just the kind of federal intrusion the Congress feared.64 By charac-
terizing Kaiser's affirmative action program as "voluntary" the Court shut
its eyes to the fact that the OFCC has for some time compelled employers to
practice racial balancing or risk the loss of their federal contracts. 65 The
influence of the OFCC on Kaiser's decision to adopt the program was sub-
stantial. 66 The governmental intrusion that would result from a statutory
prohibition against racial balancing seems less significant than the constant
federal surveillance and pressure validated sub silencio in this case.
V. WEBER AND THE CONSTITUTION
It is not surprising that the Supreme Court chose to assume, somewhat
artificially, that the Kaiser training program was voluntarily adopted. For
one thing, the parties argued the case largely under this theory. Further-
more, a finding that agents of the federal government were requiring or even
"Of course, improper administration of the law is a question that may be encountered at any
time. I was speaking about the provisions of the bill." Id.
60. Those opposed to H.R. 7152 should realize that to hire a Negro solely because he
is a Negro is racial discrimination, just as much as a 'white only' employment policy.
Both forms of discrimination are prohibited by Title VII of this bill. The language of
that title simply states that race is not a qualification for employment.
110 CONG. REC. 8921 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
61. Senator Smathers, expressing the fear that employers would protect themselves "by
hiring a certain number of colored people in order to keep the might and majesty of the federal
law and its large bureaucracy off his neck," was asked by Senator Humphrey if he would be
content with the addition of a provision "that there should be no quota system." The Senator
answered that in his opinion the "bill would be improved." Id. at 7800.
62. 99 S. Ct. at 2729.
63. "[Mianagement prerogatives.., and union freedoms are to be left undisturbed to the
greatest extent possible. . . . Internal affairs of employers and labor organizations must not be
interfered with except to the limited extent that correction is required in discrimination prac-
tices." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 29, repr'nted in [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2516.
64. See 99 S. Ct. at 2749.
65. See OFCC Rev. Order No. 4, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1978). See also 99 S. Ct. at 2737 n.2.
66. The district court judge in Weber emphasized that satisfying OFCC requirements and
avoiding suits by minorities were Kaiser's "prime motivations" for adopting an affirmative ac-
tion program. 415 F. Supp. at 765.
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encouraging the private use of racial quotas would have raised the specter of
the Constitution. 67 For the OFCC to sustain its program against the charge
that it violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment, 68 the agency
would have to show the program was necessary to satisfy a permissible fed-
eral interest. 69 The Bakke case,70 with its apparent rejection of rigid racial
selection criteria as a necessary means of achieving state interests would ap-
pear to pose a major obstacle to the justification of the OFCC's conduct. A
private, voluntary program free of constitutional limitations would be much
easier to uphold.
71
VI. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TITLE VII AND THE
EXECUTIVE ORDER PROGRAM
The Weber case is the latest development in the continuing dispute over
the possible conflict between title VII and the executive order program being
administered by the Secretary of Labor. 72 The conflict has been dealt with a
number of times by the courts 73 and at least once by the Congress. 74 The
67. State action for equal protection purposes may be predicated upon the conduct of
regulatory agencies. It is not limited to acts of the legislature. Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S.
153 (1964). The informal pressure exerted by the OFCC on Kaiser could conceivably be state
action under the "encouragement" theory outlined in cases such as Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 379 (1967).
68. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Supreme Court noted that the fifth
amendment does not contain an equal protection clause as does the fourteenth amendment,
which applies only to the states. But the Court pointed out that the two concepts are not
mutually exclusive and the discrimination may be so unjustifiable that it violates due process.
Id. at 497.
69. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). Loz67g pointed out that racial distinctions
drawn by governments are subject to the most rigid scrutiny and require justification which is
far more extensive than the "rational basis" test applied in cases where race is not the basis for
the legal distinction. Id. at 8-11.
70. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
71. It should also be noted that the Court has often stated that it will avoid ruling on
constitutional questions when there are statutory or other solutions to the problem. Sete, e.g.,
Rescue Army v. Municipal Ct., 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
72. Compare 49 Comp. Gen. 59 (1969) with 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 405 (1969). For a good
discussion of the nature of the conflict, see Comment, The Philadelphia Pla. A Study in the .ynam-
its of Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1972).
73. See, e.g., Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); Contrac-
tors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); Joyce v.
McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970).
74. In 1971, Congressman Dent and Senator Ervin spearheaded attacks on the power of
the OFCC to demand racial balancing by employers even though such conduct might not be
permissible under title VII itself. Proposed amendments to pending legislation and to the Civil
Rights Act itself which would have put an end to the OFCC's activities were defeated in both
houses. It has been argued that these events mean that the President's executive order program
is no longer susceptible to challenges based on the separation of powers. See, Comment, The
Philadephia Plan" 4 Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. CmI. L. REv. 723, 757 (1972).
Even if the refusal to pass legislation halting the OFCC's affirmative action program can be
taken for a sign that a majority of the members of both houses really approved of nonremedial
government sponsored racial balancing, such approval does not resolve the conflict between title
VII and the executive order program. The views of a later Congress are entitled to little weight
in construing the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The intent of the Congress that enacted the statute
controls. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977). A
true resolution of the conflict would probably require an amendment to the statute specifically
providing for government-imposed racial balancing. See Employment Discrnmination and Tille VIIof
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1304 (1971).
[Vol. 57:4
TITLE VII REVISED
possibility of conflict arises, among other things, because the OFCC regula-
tions appear to require employers to engage in racial balancing in violation
of section 7030) and the general anti-discrimination provisions of title VII.
There is no requirement in the OFCC regulations that any racial preference
be a remedy for an employer's past discrimination. 75 A mere underutiliza-
tion of minorities is enough to require an employer to develop "goals" and
"timetables" and make efforts to meet them.76
Given the outcome of the Weber case, there was little chance that the
Court would give any overt recognition to this possible conflict. To do so
would then have required that the President's executive order program be
sustainable in spite of its incompatibility with the will of Congress. In light
of the historic decision in Youngstown Sheet Metal & Tube v. Sawyer,77 all the
parties seemed to agree that in a contest of strength, the President's program
would perish in the face of the primary right of Congress to legislate in this
area.78 Hence, the majority was obliged to find room in title VII itself for
Kaiser's affirmative action program, and any conflict between the OFCC
program and title VII was quietly resolved in favor of the former.
CONCLUSION
The Weber case has established the validity of reasonable affirmative
action programs designed to overcome racial imbalances in our factories.
The Supreme Court is to be commended for providing a relatively clear an-
swer to this question, in contrast to the confusing decision in Bakke; but one
may question whether the price of clarity was too great in this case. The
majority's interpretation of title VII is subject to doubt, and it is difficult to
reconcile the opinion with the previous decisions of the Court in this area.
The Court also seems to have ducked the issue of whether private employers
can, consistently with title VII and the Constitution, be pressured by the
federal government into racial balancing. Finally, the result seems inconsis-
tent with the traditional notion of judicial restraint. Justice Burger may
have been accurate in his characterization of the decision as a judicial
amendment of title VII. 79 If this is so, then the decision to allow the use of
strict racial classifications in the work place should have been entrusted to
Congress.80 Only the elected representatives of the people have the right to
make such a decision. The need for a national debate on this issue should
not have been underestimated in a country which supposedly considers ra-
75. 118 CONG. REc. 1385 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Saxbe).
76. OFCC Rev. Order No. 4, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12 (1978).
77. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
78. Brief for Petitioner United Steelworkers at 82-83; Brief for Petitioner Kaiser Aluminum
& Chem. Corp. at 34; Brief for Respondent at 80; Brief for Certiorari for Petitioner EEOC at 16.
79. 99 S. Ct. at 2734.
80. The defeat of the Dent and Ervin amendments in 1971 cannot be considered adequate
approval of the kind of affirmative action program adopted by Kaiser. It is far easier for legisla-
tors to vote against an amendment that would outlaw racial balancing than to approve affirma-
tively an amendment to the Civil Rights Act specifically allowing such government-mandated
race consciousness.
1980]
660 DENVER LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 57:4
cial distinctions between citizens "odious to a free people . "81
Charles W. Schlosser, Jr.
81. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
